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HEY! THAT’S MY VALOR: THE STOLEN 
VALOR ACT AND GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION OF FALSE SPEECH  
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Abstract: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes lies about receiving military 
decorations. Through the Stolen Valor Act, the government seeks to pro-
tect the honor associated with receiving a military decoration from people 
who falsely claim to have received one. Some courts have held that the 
false statements proscribed by the Stolen Valor Act fall outside of First 
Amendment protection. Other courts, most notably the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in the 2010 decision United States v. Alvarez, 
held that lies about military decorations are protected speech and that the 
Stolen Valor Act is unconstitutional because it does not meet strict scru-
tiny. This Note argues that the First Amendment protects false statements. 
Section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act does not fall into any category of 
unprotected speech, does not meet the strict scrutiny test for government 
regulation of protected speech, and therefore is an unconstitutional re-
striction of protected speech. 
Introduction 
 On July 23, 2007, at a meeting of the Three Valley Water District 
Board of Directors in suburban Los Angeles, newly elected director Xa-
vier Alvarez introduced himself: “I’m a retired Marine of twenty-five 
years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy. 
I’m still around.”1 Apart from the last sentence, Alvarez’s introduction 
was a series of lies.2 Alvarez never served a day in any branch of the U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
1 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). The Congressional Medal of Honor is the highest 
award for valor in action against an enemy force. The Medal of Honor, Cong. Medal of 
Honor Soc’y, http://www.cmohs.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). The Congressional 
Medal of Honor is generally presented by the President of the United States of America in 
the name of Congress to individuals serving in the armed services of the United States. Id. 
The first Medal of Honor was presented March 25, 1863 to Private Jacob Parrott and there 
have been 3454 Congressional Medal of Honor recipients since. Archive Statistics, Cong. 
Medal of Honor Soc’y, http://www.cmohs.org/medal-statistics.php (last visited Mar. 12, 
2012). Only eighty-five Congressional Medal of Honor recipients are still alive. Id. 
2 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201. 
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armed forces and certainly was never awarded the Congressional Medal 
of Honor.3 
 Even prior to Alvarez’s lies at the water district meeting, he was 
known for his tall tales.4 In addition to lying about military service and 
decorations, Alvarez had claimed to be a professional hockey player, a 
former police officer, and the former husband of a Mexican starlet.5 
The district court observed that Alvarez seemed to live in a make-
believe world.6 
 Alvarez was prosecuted under § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act in 
the District Court for the Central District of California for his false 
claim that he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.7 The 
Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime to lie about receiving military decora-
tions and carries an enhanced penalty for lying about receipt of the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.8 The Congressional Medal of Honor is 
the nation’s highest military honor, awarded to members of the U.S. 
armed forces for exceptional heroism and bravery in combat.9 Alvarez 
entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to challenge 
the Act’s constitutionality.10 Alvarez was sentenced to three years proba-
tion, a $5000 fine, and 416 hours of community service.11 
 The Stolen Valor Act is controversial because it imposes a fine and 
a criminal penalty of up to a year in prison simply for making a false 
statement about receiving a military decoration, either verbally or by 
wearing a medal.12 The First Amendment protects a speaker’s right to 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. at 1200–01. 
4 Id. at 1201. 
5 Id. After he was charged under the Stolen Valor Act, Alvarez responded, “Somebody 
is making up stories. What you got there is a bunch of crap.” Fred Ortega, False Medal 
Claim Denied, The Sun (L.A.), Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.sbsun.com/ci_7009147. 
6 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201. During sentencing, the district court indicated that Alva-
rez’s stories lacked credibility and suggested that they may be related to a psychological or 
alcohol problem. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 20 n.5, Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-
50345). 
7 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201; see 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), (c) (2006). Specifically, Alvarez was 
charged with “falsely represent[ing] verbally that he had been awarded the Congressional 
Medal of Honor when, in truth and as [he] knew, he had not received the Congressional 
Medal of Honor.” Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201. 
8 18 U.S.C. § 704(a), (b), (c). 
9 See 32 C.F.R. § 578.4 (2008) (“The deed performed must have been one of personal 
bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his com-
rades and must have involved risk of life.”), reserved by 73 Fed. Reg. 66754 (Nov. 12, 2008); Full 
Archive, Cong. Medal of Honor Soc’y, http://www.cmohs.org/recipient-archive.php (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
10 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 2. 
11 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201. 
12 See id. at 1200. 
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express ideas, even false ideas or lies, without government interfer-
ence.13 Except in limited categories defined by the U.S. Supreme Court 
as obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, or speech integral to crim-
inal conduct, speech is presumptively protected by the First Amend-
ment.14 The government must meet strict scrutiny in order to regulate 
speech protected under the First Amendment.15 The government has 
historically regulated false speech that causes harm, such as defama-
tion, by allowing lawsuits with potential civil damages, but not criminal 
penalties.16 The Stolen Valor Act, which carries potential criminal sanc-
tions, has been challenged by several defendants with varying success as 
an unconstitutional speech restriction.17 
 The Stolen Valor Act seeks to address the perceived harm to veter-
ans’ honor and to the government caused by a person lying about re-
ceiving a military decoration.18 Through the Stolen Valor Act, the gov-
ernment attempts to preserve the honor of military decorations, in part 
to motivate military personnel to high levels of achievement.19 Accord-
ing to the government, the Stolen Valor Act is necessary to prevent the 
proliferation of false medals and false claims concerning military ser-
vice.20 
                                                                                                                      
13 See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
14 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010). 
15 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. Strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of judicial re-
view. See John T. Haggerty, Note, Begging and the Public Forum Doctrine in the First Amendment, 
34 B.C. L. Rev. 1121, 1126 (1993). Under strict scrutiny, the court will determine whether 
the restriction on a fundamental right is necessary to the furtherance of a compelling state 
interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. 
16 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 283 (1964). 
17 See United States v. Perelman (Perelman II ), 658 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding § 704(a) of the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional); Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200 
(holding § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional); United States v. Lawless, No. 
11-cr-475-PJM/11-mj-173-TMD, slip op. at 9 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2011) (holding § 704(b) of 
the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional); United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 822 
(W.D. Va. 2011) (holding § 704(a) of the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional); United States 
v. Strandlof, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1185 (D. Colo. 2010) (holding § 704(b) of the Stolen 
Valor Act unconstitutional). But see United States v. McGuinn, No. 07 Cr. 471(KNF), 2007 
WL 3050502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007) (holding § 704(a) of the Stolen Valor Act con-
stitutional). 
18 Government’s Answering Brief at 6, Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-50345). In its 
brief the government states that its interest is in “safeguarding the honor of the nation’s 
war heroes.” Id. 
19 United States v. Perelman (Perelman I ), 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1237 (D. Nev. 2010), 
aff’d, 658 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2011). 
20 See id. 
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 In the 2010 case United States v. Alvarez, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed Alvarez’s district court conviction and 
held that the Stolen Valor Act is facially invalid under the First 
Amendment.21 The Ninth Circuit in Alvarez held that § 704(b) of the 
Stolen Valor Act regulates protected speech, does not meet strict scru-
tiny, is not narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling government inter-
est, and is therefore unconstitutional.22 The Ninth Circuit worried 
about the Act’s potential to set a precedent whereby the government 
may proscribe speech simply because it is false.23 On October 17, 2011, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision in Alvarez.24 
 In contrast to its decision in Alvarez that § 704(b) of the Stolen 
Valor Act warrants strict scrutiny, in the 2011 case United States v. Perel-
man (Perelman II), the Ninth Circuit held that § 704(a) of the Stolen 
Valor Act, regulating falsely wearing a medal, warrants intermediate 
scrutiny.25 The court reasoned that intermediate scrutiny was sufficient 
because the section regulates conduct as opposed to speech.26 The 
Ninth Circuit held that § 704(a) meets the intermediate scrutiny test 
because there is a substantial government interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression and because the restriction imposed on First 
Amendment freedoms by the Stolen Valor Act is no greater than neces-
sary to further this government interest.27 
 Part I of this Note describes the history of the Stolen Valor Act and 
the Alvarez case, highlighting the central question of whether the 
speech proscribed under the Stolen Valor Act warrants strict scrutiny 
review.28 Part II presents the framework for analyzing whether the First 
Amendment protects certain classes of speech, namely false speech.29 It 
then describes the strict scrutiny standard of review that determines 
whether the government can permissibly regulate protected speech.30 
Finally, Part III argues that § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act is an un-
                                                                                                                      
21 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1217. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. at 1200. 
24 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
25 Perelman II, 658 F.3d at 1139. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1139–40. 
28 See infra notes 32–62 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 63–118 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 119–170 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional restriction of speech protected under the First Amend-
ment.31 
I. The Stolen Valor Act and the Alvarez Decision 
A. History and Text of the Stolen Valor Act 
 False claims of military decoration have been a concern since the 
founding of the United States.32 In 1782, General George Washington 
created the Military Merit Badge, designed in the shape of a purple 
heart, to be awarded to privates and noncommissioned officers who 
demonstrated unusual gallantry, extraordinary fidelity, or essential ser-
vice.33 Even from the advent of military decorations, General Washing-
ton was concerned that imposters may claim to be Military Merit Badge 
recipients.34 Thus, Washington admonished, “[S]hould any who are 
not entitled to these honors have the insolence to assume the badges of 
them, they shall be severely punished.”35 
 The Stolen Valor Act puts General Washington’s admonition into 
effect by making it a crime to knowingly wear, purchase, or sell any of 
the service medals or badges awarded to members of the armed forc-
es.36 The Act also proscribes false verbal or written claims to have re-
                                                                                                                      
 
31 See infra notes 171–262 and accompanying text. 
32 See 24 The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript 
Sources 1745–1799, at 487–88 ( John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938). 
33 Id. at 488. 
The General ever desirous to cherish virtuous ambition in his soldiers, as well 
as to foster and encourage every species of Military merit, directs that when-
ever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the author of it shall be 
permitted to wear on his facings over the left breast, the figure of a heart in 
purple cloth, or silk, edged with narrow lace or binding. 
Id. 
34 See id. at 487–88. 
35 Id. at 487. 
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006). The relevant portion of the text of the Stolen Valor 
Act is: 
(a) In general. Whoever knowingly wears, purchases, attempts to purchase, 
solicits for purchase, mails, ships, imports, exports, produces blank certifi-
cates of receipt for, manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, advertises for sale, 
trades, barters, or exchanges for anything of value any decoration or medal 
authorized by Congress for the armed forces of the United States, or any of 
the service medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, or the 
ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration or medal, or any 
colorable imitation thereof, except when authorized under regulations made 
pursuant to law, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
six months, or both. (b) False claims about receipt of military decorations or 
780 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:775 
ceived military decorations or medals.37 The Stolen Valor Act was en-
acted in 1923, but the current version broadens the historical scope of 
the Act.38 The 1923 Act criminalized the unauthorized wearing, manu-
facture, or sale of medals and badges.39 The current version, passed in 
2006, has been expanded to prohibit verbal claims about receiving mili-
tary awards and other activities, including purchasing, mailing, and im-
porting medals or badges.40 The 2006 Act was passed in response to a 
congressional finding that fraudulent claims regarding the receipt of 
the Medal of Honor and other military decorations damage their repu-
tation and meaning, and that legislative action was necessary to allow 
law enforcement to prevent false claims of receiving military decora-
tions.41 
 The government has an interest in maintaining the honor associ-
ated with military awards.42 The purpose of the medals program, ac-
cording to the government, is to foster military accomplishment by 
recognizing excellence in the armed forces.43 Accordingly, a violation 
of the Stolen Valor Act carries a prison term of six months, a fine, or 
both.44 The prison term is enhanced from six months to one year if the 
                                                                                                                      
medals. Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, 
to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for 
the Armed Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or badges 
awarded to the members of such forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any 
such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable imitation of such item 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 
(c) Enhanced penalty for offenses involving Congressional Medal of Honor. 
(1) In general. If a decoration or medal involved in an offense under subsec-
tion (a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the punishment 
provided in that subsection, the offender shall be fined under this title, im-
prisoned not more than 1 year, or both . . . . 
Id. § 704(a), (b), (c). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. § 704(a), (b) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286). 
39 Act of Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286. 
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b); Perelman I, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
41 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1199 n.1; 151 Cong. Rec. S12684 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Conrad). According to one of the bill’s sponsors, 
[T]here are some individuals who diminish the accomplishments of award 
recipients by using medals they have not earned. These imposters use fake 
medals—or claim to have medals that they have not earned—to gain credibil-
ity in their communities. These fraudulent acts can often lead to the perpe-
tration of very serious crimes. 
151 Cong. Rec. S12684 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Conrad). 
42 Perelman I, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 1237. 
43 Id. 
44 18 U.S.C. § 704(a), (b). 
2012] The Stolen Valor Act and Government Regulation of False Speech 781 
decoration involved is the Congressional Medal of Honor, a Distin-
guished Service Cross, a Navy Cross, an Air Force Cross, a Silver Star, or 
a Purple Heart.45 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s United States v. Alvarez Decision 
 In 2010 in Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc held two-to-
one that § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act is an unconstitutional restric-
tion of speech protected by the First Amendment because it is not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.46 The ma-
jority held that the speech proscribed by the Stolen Valor Act is not 
analogous to the narrow categories of speech that fall outside of First 
Amendment protection: obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, or 
speech integral to criminal conduct.47 Because the speech proscribed 
by the Stolen Valor Act receives full First Amendment protection, any 
regulation must meet strict scrutiny.48 The majority held that, because 
the Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government 
interest, it does not meet strict scrutiny and is therefore unconstitu-
tional.49 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. § 704(c), (d); see Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1202. The Distinguished Service Cross and 
the Air Force Cross are military honors one step below the Congressional Medal of Honor 
and can be awarded to a member of the United States Army or Air Force, respectively, for 
extraordinary heroism while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States, 
military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with 
friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in 
which the United States is not a belligerent party. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3742, 8742 (2006). The 
Navy Cross is a similar award for members of the Navy, it is the highest medal awarded by 
the United States Navy and can be awarded for both combat heroism and other distin-
guished service. See The Navy Cross, Naval Hist. & Heritage Command, http://www.his- 
tory.navy.mil/medals/navcross.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). The Silver Star is currently 
awarded by all branches of the armed forces to any person who, while serving in any capac-
ity, is cited for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States. Factsheet: Silver 
Star, Air Force Personnel Ctr., http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/library/factsheets/ 
factsheet.asp?id=7729 (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). Finally, the Purple Heart is an honor 
awarded to a member of the armed forces who is killed or wounded in action. See 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1129 (2006). 
46 617 F.3d at 1200. 
47 Id. at 1202 (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584); see infra notes 92–118 and acco-
mopanying text (discussing defamation). 
48 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. Strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of judicial re-
view. See Haggerty, supra note 15, at 1126. Under strict scrutiny, a court will determine 
whether the restriction on a fundamental right is necessary to the furtherance of a com-
pelling state interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. 
49 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
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 Both the majority and dissent in Alvarez agreed that the Stolen 
Valor Act did not meet strict scrutiny.50 They disagreed, however, on 
whether the speech proscribed by the Stolen Valor Act is protected un-
der the First Amendment and is therefore deserving of strict scrutiny 
review in the event that it is proscribed.51 The Stolen Valor Act, both 
the majority and dissent agreed, did not meet strict scrutiny because 
the government was unable to show that it is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest.52 
 The asserted government interest in the Stolen Valor Act is to pre-
vent false claims about receipt of military honors that damage the repu-
tation of such decorations.53 The Ninth Circuit suggested that this is 
not a compelling government interest.54 The court reasoned that em-
bellished war stories are easily detectable falsehoods and that lies about 
military decorations only harm the reputation of the liars; thus, the 
court concluded that such lies pose no real threat to the honor associ-
ated with military decorations.55 Further, according to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Stolen Valor Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve the gov-
ernment interest because there are less speech-restrictive ways to 
protect the honor associated with military decorations.56 The harm 
caused by false claims about military decorations can be easily cor-
rected in the marketplace of ideas by publishing lists of true award re-
cipients.57 
 The fundamental disagreement between the majority and the dis-
sent in Alvarez is whether statements regulated by the Stolen Valor Act, 
and false statements of fact generally, warrant strict scrutiny or whether 
they fall completely outside of First Amendment protection.58 The dis-
                                                                                                                      
50 See id. at 1215–17. In their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the gov-
ernment argues that § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act would pass strict scrutiny because the 
Act is narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling government interest. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 29, Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (2010) (No. 11-210), 2011 WL 3645396 at *29. 
51 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1232 n.10 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 1216 (majority opinion); id. at 1232 n.10 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. at 1216 (majority opinion). 
54 See id. at 1217. 
55 See id. 
56 Id. 
57 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216–17. Alvarez’s lie was detected in the marketplace even be-
fore he faced criminal prosecution. Id. at 1216. There are several online grassroots organi-
zations designed to expose people who lie about military decorations. See Hall of Stolen 
Valor, Military Times, http://militarytimes.com/projects/hallofstolenvalor (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2012); Report Stolen Valor, Amvets, http://www.reportstolenvalor.org (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2012); Stolen Valor: Heroes and Patriots. Or Are They?, StolenValor.com, http:// 
www.stolenvalor.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (including a link to “Report a Fake”). 
58 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216–17; id at 1232 n.10 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
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sent in Alvarez argued that the false statements of fact proscribed by the 
Stolen Valor Act are not protected by the First Amendment and thus 
can be regulated without meeting strict scrutiny.59 The dissent started 
from the premise that false statements of fact are not, and were never, 
protected under the First Amendment.60 The dissent relied on a 1974 
Supreme Court decision, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., for the proposition 
that a false statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protec-
tion.61 Therefore, according to the dissent, because false statements of 
fact like those the Stolen Valor Act prohibits are not protected under 
the First Amendment, they may be constitutionally proscribed without 
passing the strict scrutiny test.62 
                                                                                                                     
II. The Stolen Valor Act and First Amendment Framework 
 This Part discusses the First Amendment framework for determin-
ing when and how the government may regulate speech, including the 
false speech criminalized by the Stolen Valor Act.63 Section A discusses 
the presumption of First Amendment protection for all speech, includ-
ing false speech.64 Section B then addresses these categories of speech 
that the Supreme Court has held fall outside of First Amendment pro-
tection.65 Section C explains that the government must satisfy strict scru-
tiny to regulate protected speech, including false verbal claims about 
military decorations.66 It further contrasts the requisite strict scrutiny 
review of proscribed, protected speech with the intermediate review 
standard used to analyze regulated communicative conduct.67 Finally, 
Section D addresses constitutional challenges on overbreadth grounds, 
but concludes that the Stolen Valor Act’s constitutional infirmity is likely 
not overbreadth.68 
 
59 See id. at 1218–19, 1231. 
60 Id. at 1220 n.1. 
61 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional 
value in false statements of fact . . . .”); Alvarez, 617 F.2d at 1221 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
62 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1223 (Bybee, J., dissenting). The dissent agrees with the majority 
that if the Stolen Valor Act were subject to strict scrutiny, it would not satisfy the test. Id. at 
1232. 
63 See infra notes 64–170 and accompanying text. 
64 See infra notes 69–91 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 92–118 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 119–149 and accompanying text. 
67 See infra notes 119–149 and accompanying text. 
68 See infra notes 150–170 and accompanying text. 
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A. The First Amendment Protects False Speech 
 One scholar has suggested that understanding the relationship 
between deception and free speech is central to understanding the 
First Amendment.69 Although the First Amendment prevents the gov-
ernment from regulating speech simply because the government or 
society finds the idea worthless or offensive—content-based speech re-
strictions—the prevention and punishment of certain well-defined and 
narrow classes of speech does not raise any constitutional problems.70 
Nonetheless, the First Amendment imposes a presumption against gov-
ernment interference with public discourse.71 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has a strong tradition of protecting even 
unpopular ideas and controversial beliefs.72 The Supreme Court has 
explained, however, that the First Amendment does not protect all 
types of speech.73 Some false speech, such as defamation or shouting 
“fire” in a crowded theatre without cause, is carved out and afforded 
less or no First Amendment protection.74 In such cases, the false speech 
is unprotected because it causes harm by violating a private right or be-
cause it creates a clear and present danger or “substantive evil[] that 
Congress has a right to prevent.”75 
 Constitutional protection, however, does not turn on the truth, 
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs expressed.76 In 1964 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a news-
                                                                                                                      
69 Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat 
Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1107, 1140 (2006). 
70 Chaplinsky v. State of N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). In United States v. Robbins, 
the District Court for the Western District of Virginia did not follow Chaplinsky, holding 
that false statements of fact are generally unprotected and that protection is only afforded 
to “speech that matters.” See 759 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818 (W.D. Va. 2011). 
71 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where’s the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 1091, 1091–92 (2008); see  United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1205 (9th 
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210) (“[W]e presump-
tively protect all speech against government interference, leaving it to the government to 
demonstrate, either through a well-crafted statute or case-specific application, the historical 
basis for or a compelling need to remove some speech from protection.”). 
72 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
708 (1969). Some European countries have less protection for speech than the United 
States and punish people who deny the Holocaust occurred. See Lidsky, supra note 71, at 
1099. 
73 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
74 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); Schenck v. United States, 
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
75 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A 
Threat to Liberty, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225, 238 (1992). 
76 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964). 
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paper advertisement does not forfeit First Amendment protection be-
cause some included statements were false and allegedly defamatory.77 
 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this presumption of pro-
tection by rejecting a balancing test for determining when a false 
statement receives First Amendment protection.78 The government, 
according to the Court, cannot proscribe false speech simply because it 
is deemed valueless or unnecessary following an ad hoc balancing of its 
values against its harms.79 
 Despite the constitutional presumption of protection for speech, 
courts that have upheld the Stolen Valor Act as constitutional question 
whether knowingly false statements of fact, such as lying about military 
decorations, truly add value to public discourse and dialogue.80 There 
is Supreme Court support for the proposition that there is no value to 
knowingly false speech.81 In the 1942 case of Chaplinsky v. State of New 
Hampshire, the Supreme Court said that false speech has “no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas” and provides “slight social value as a 
step to truth.”82 In 1974, the Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., also stated that false statements of fact do not hold any constitu-
tional value.83 The dissent in the 2010 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit case United States v. Alvarez and other courts that have 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. at 271. 
78 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
79 Id.; United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (D. Colo. 2010) (“The 
government’s argument, which invites it to determine what topics of speech ‘matter’ 
enough for the citizenry to hear, is troubling, as well as contrary, on multiple fronts, to 
well-established First Amendment doctrine.”). In 2010, in United States v. Stevens, the Su-
preme Court held that a 1999 federal law criminalizing the commercial creation, sale, or 
possession of depictions of animal cruelty was substantially overbroad, and thus, facially 
invalid. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. The statute was designed to address “crush videos,” vid-
eos showing people killing small animals by stomping on them or other cruel methods. See 
id. at 1583. 
80 See United States v. Perelman (Perelman II ), 658 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011); Rob-
bins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 819. 
81 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
82 315 U.S. at 572. 
83 418 U.S. at 340. The Court wrote: 
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s 
interest in “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues. They 
belong to that category of utterances which “are no essential part of any ex-
position of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). In 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court recognized the declaration in Gertz to be 
dictum. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). 
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held the Stolen Valor Act constitutional have relied on Gertz for the 
proposition that knowingly false statements of fact fall outside of First 
Amendment protection.84 
 Even though knowingly false statements of fact may have little in-
herent value, they are inevitable in free debate and must be tolerated to 
avoid chilling vigorous debate and exchange of ideas.85 A rule compel-
ling a person to guarantee the truth of all factual assertions could lead 
to self-censorship.86 Punishing false statements would risk making peo-
ple overly cautious in the exercise of their freedoms of speech and 
press.87 Erroneous statements must therefore be protected for freedom 
of expression to have the breathing space needed to survive.88 Perhaps 
it was this concern about the chilling effects of withholding constitu-
tional protection for knowingly false statements that led the Supreme 
Court in Gertz, to also state that there is no such thing as a false idea (as 
opposed to a false statement of fact) under the First Amendment.89 
The Court said that the marketplace of ideas, through public debate 
and discourse, was the proper forum to correct falsehood, not the judi-
cial system or the government.90 Mistaken beliefs, according to the 
Court, hold value in the marketplace of ideas because they offer con-
trast and thus create a clearer perception of the truth.91 
                                                                                                                     
B. Narrow Categories of False Speech That Fall Outside of First Amendment 
Protection and Defamation Analysis 
 The First Amendment presumptively protects all speech from gov-
ernment regulation; however, there are limitations to this protection.92 
If the government demonstrates a compelling need to regulate speech 
or if the speech is in a category of speech historically held outside of 
 
84 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1218 (Bybee, J., dissenting); Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 819. 
85 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
86 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 271–72; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“Because First Amend-
ment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only 
with narrow specificity.”); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982). 
89 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–40 (“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a 
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on 
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”). 
90 Id. 
91 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859). 
92 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1205. In 1996, Justice Elena Kagan, then a law professor, recog-
nized the near absolute First Amendment protection afforded to false, but non-defamatory, 
statements of fact outside of the commercial realm. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: 
The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 477 (1996). 
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First Amendment protection, then the speech may be constitutionally 
restricted.93 Certain narrow categories of false speech have been carved 
out and afforded less First Amendment protection, such as defamation, 
false commercial speech, and fraud.94 
 Of the categories of speech that are afforded less First Amendment 
protection, false statements prohibited by the Stolen Valor Act are most 
like defamatory statements.95 Defamation is the act of harming the 
reputation of another by making a false statement to a third person.96 
It is regulated through civil suits brought when such false statements 
cause individualized harm.97 As such, the Stolen Valor Act is akin to 
defamation only if the reputation of an individual decorated veteran is 
harmed by a speaker’s false claim about valor.98 
 Defamation law is justified by the government interest in compen-
sating individual victims of defamatory falsehoods.99 It is designed to 
protect an individual’s property interest in his or her good name.100 In 
a defamation case, the court balances the government interest in com-
pensating defamation plaintiffs for reputational harm against the 
speaker-defendant’s First Amendment freedom of speech.101 To 
achieve this balance, the court has developed a series of rules based on 
the identity of the plaintiff (whether the plaintiff is a private or public 
figure) and the nature of the subject matter (whether it is a matter of 
public concern).102 When a defamation plaintiff is a public figure and 
the speaker is criticizing public conduct or speaking on a matter of 
public concern, the court is willing to afford the speaker more First 
Amendment protection.103 This is, in part, because public figures are 
better able to engage in effective counterspeech.104 False statements 
                                                                                                                      
93 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1205. The dissent in Alvarez stated that 
false statements are unprotected by the First Amendment, except in narrow categories 
where protection is necessary to protect speech that matters. 617 F.3d at 1218–19 (Bybee, 
J., dissenting). 
94 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1205. 
95 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1205. 
96 Black’s Law Dictionary 479–80 (9th ed. 2009). 
97 See State of Wash. ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 
691, 697 (Wash. 1998). 
98 See 119 Vote No!, 957 P.2d at 697. 
99 See id. 
100 Id. 
101 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341; N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 254. 
102 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 1045 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
103 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256. 
104 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
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regarding private persons in a matter of private concern, however, re-
ceive less protection.105 
                                                                                                                     
 The Supreme Court first addressed defamation of a public official 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964 and limited the circumstances 
under which a public official may recover for defamation.106 In New 
York Times, a city commissioner brought a libel claim against the news-
paper for printing an advertisement critical of his official conduct.107 
The advertisement included false factual statements that reflected 
poorly on the City Commissioner.108 The Supreme Court held that the 
advertisement was entitled to First Amendment protection despite the 
false statements.109 According to the Court, erroneous statements are 
inevitable in free debate and must be protected if freedom of expres-
sion is to have the breathing space necessary to survive.110 A public of-
ficial may only recover for defamation if the plaintiff can show that the 
statement was made with actual malice, meaning that the speaker in-
tended to cause harm and either had knowledge that the statement was 
false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.111 
 Ten years after New York Times, in Gertz, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed defamation of a private individual regarding a matter of public 
concern.112 In Gertz, the Supreme Court distinguished between public 
and private figures and described why different standards apply to 
each.113 Public figures tend to enjoy greater access to the channels of 
effective communication and have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals.114 Moreover, pub-
lic figures have made the choice to be in the public eye and thus volun-
 
105 Id. 
106 See 376 U.S. at 256. 
107 Id. Libel is written defamation. Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 96, at 999. 
108 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 257–58. Statements included: 
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang “My Country, ’Tis of Thee” on 
the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truck-
loads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State 
College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities 
by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to 
starve them into submission. 
Id. 
109 Id. at 292. 
110 Id. at 271–72. 
111 Id. at 279–80. 
112 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332. 
113 Id. at 323. 
114 Id. at 344. 
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tarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory 
falsehoods.115 
 In sum, the First Amendment provides significantly less protection 
for speech that falls within several limited categories, such as fraudulent 
and defamatory speech.116 Within these categories, there are grada-
tions of First Amendment protection.117 For example, although fraudu-
lent speech receives absolutely no First Amendment protection, courts 
are less willing to proscribe defamatory speech against a public official 
because public officials have greater opportunities for effective coun-
terspeech than private individuals.118 
                                                                                                                     
C. The Court Must Apply Strict Scrutiny to Determine When the Government 
May Regulate Protected Speech and Intermediate Scrutiny to Determine  
When the Government May Regulate Communicative Conduct 
1. Courts Review Regulation of Protected Speech Under a Strict 
Scrutiny Standard 
 Both the majority and the dissent in Alvarez agreed that § 704(b) 
of the Stolen Valor Act is a content- or subject-matter-based speech re-
striction because it regulates false verbal or written representations 
about a particular topic—receiving military honors.119 Content-based 
restrictions regulate speech based on the topic of the speech.120 Con-
tent-based speech restrictions, like section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor 
Act, are particularly dangerous for free speech because the government 
can target particular messages and control ideas by regulating speech 
on a specific topic.121 If the government regulates particular views or 
 
115 Id. at 345. 
116 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584. 
117 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256. 
118 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256. 
119 United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 667 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying petition for 
panel rehearing and rehearing en banc); Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1202, 1218–19 (Bybee, J., 
dissenting). For the purposes of this Note, this category of speech restrictions is referred 
to as “content-based” restrictions. 
120 Chemerinsky, supra note 102, at 934. An example of a law that restricts speech 
based on the subject matter is a Chicago ordinance prohibiting all picketing in residential 
neighborhoods except labor picketing. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459–60 (1980). In 
the 1980 case Carey v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that the Chicago ordinance was un-
constitutional because it allowed speech on the topic of labor but not other speech and 
therefore was not subject matter neutral. Id. at 456. Similarly, the Stolen Valor Act restricts 
lies about a specific topic. See id. 
121 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 116 (1991). 
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subjects, it silences speakers who express views on disfavored sub-
jects.122 Thus, content-based speech restrictions distort the marketplace 
of ideas and seriously impede free discussion and debate.123 
                                                                                                                     
 Viewpoint discrimination is a particularly egregious form of con-
tent-based restriction that discriminates based on a speaker’s position 
on a topic.124 Section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act may be considered 
viewpoint discrimination because the Act prevents people from telling 
lies that disparage military honors.125 In the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada, in the 2010 case United States v. Perelman, attorneys for 
Perelman argued that the Stolen Valor Act impermissibly gives the gov-
ernment discretion to engage in viewpoint-based regulation of speech 
by allowing some people, but not others, to wear military medals based 
on their purpose for wearing the medal.126 The district court, however, 
held that the Stolen Valor Act is not impermissible because military 
regulations provide an across-the-board prohibition on the unauthor-
ized wearing of medals with the intent to deceive and do not allow the 
government any discretion to decide who can and cannot wear medals 
on a case-by-case basis.127 Even though the court was not persuaded by 
Perelman’s claim of viewpoint-based discrimination, the Stolen Valor 
Act is still a content-based restriction and thus presumptively invalid 
due to the dangers discussed above.128 
 Content-based speech restrictions are presumptively invalid and 
subject to strict scrutiny unless the restriction falls into a narrow cate-
gory of speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment.129 Thus, if 
 
 
122 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992). 
123 Chemerinsky, supra note 102, at 934. The marketplace of ideas is a metaphor for 
freedom of speech and is basically a forum where ideas can compete for acceptance with-
out government regulation. Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 96, at 1058. 
124 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 102, at 934. For example, the Supreme Court declared a District 
of Columbia ordinance that prohibited the display of signs critical of another government 
within 500 feet of that government’s embassy to be an unconstitutional viewpoint-based 
regulation. See Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988). 
125 See Perelman II, 658 F.3d at 1204 n.4. 
126 United States v. Perelman (Perelman I ), 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1232 (D. Nev. 2010), 
aff’d, 658 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2011). A licensing scheme or a prior restraint is a scheme that 
requires permission from the government before one may engage in constitutionally pro-
tected expression. Id. at 1237. Attorneys for Perelman argued that under the Act, the gov-
ernment could permit an actor in a patriotic theatrical production to wear a medal, but 
deny a war protester’s request to wear the same medal. Id. at 1232. 
127 Id. at 1232–33. 
128 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1202; Perelman I, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 1232–33. 
129 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“[T]he First Amend-
ment, subject only to narrow and well understood exceptions, does not countenance gov-
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the Stolen Valor Act regulates speech protected under the First 
Amendment, the government must meet strict scrutiny for the Act to 
be constitutional.130 Strict scrutiny requires the government to show 
that there is a compelling government interest for the regulation of 
speech and that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est.131 
2. Courts Apply Intermediate Scrutiny to Regulations of Communicative 
Conduct 
 In contrast to making a statement, wearing a medal is communica-
tive conduct; therefore, § 704(a) of the Stolen Valor Act, which makes it 
a crime to wear a military decoration without authorization, is subject 
to intermediate scrutiny.132 
 The Supreme Court has long afforded First Amendment protec-
tion to communicative conduct because it often functions as symbolic 
speech.133 The government can regulate communicative conduct if the 
regulation meets the intermediate scrutiny test laid out by the Supreme 
Court in 1969 in United States v. O’Brien.134 
 In Perelman, for example, the court distinguished Perelman’s prose-
cution under § 704(a), which criminalizes the unauthorized wear of a 
military decoration, from Alvarez’s prosecution under § 704(b), which 
prohibits verbal or written false claims about military decorations.135 
The Ninth Circuit held that § 704(a) targets legitimately criminal con-
duct and therefore that section of the Stolen Valor Act is constitu-
                                                                                                                      
ernment control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.”); R.A.V., 
505 U.S. at 382; supra notes 92–118 and accompanying text. 
130 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000); Turner, 512 
U.S. at 623. Regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech must meet the lower 
standard of intermediate scrutiny. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642. In Turner, the court held that 
“the First Amendment, subject to only narrow and well understood exceptions, does not 
countenance government control over the content of messages expressed by private indi-
viduals.” Id. at 641. 
131 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010); Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216. 
132 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06. 
133 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (holding that taping a peace 
sign on the American flag is speech protected under the First Amendment); W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (invalidating a law that required stu-
dents to salute the flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 376 (1931) (declaring un-
constitutional a state law that prohibited the display of a red flag). 
134 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). 
135 Perelman II, 658 F.3d at 1138–39. 
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tional.136 The Ninth Circuit also noted that § 704(b), in contrast, targets 
pure speech and is therefore distinguishable.137 
 Conduct can be communicative when there is intent to convey a 
particular message and a substantial likelihood that the message will be 
understood by those who view it.138 Communicative conduct, such as 
wearing a medal, can be regarded as expressive or symbolic speech.139 
For instance, in the 1969 case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, the Supreme Court held that wearing a black armband to 
protest the Vietnam War was symbolic speech because the black arm-
band was worn to communicate a message and people viewing the 
black armband in 1965 would understand that the speaker intended to 
protest the Vietnam War.140 Similarly, wearing a military medal is sym-
bolic speech because the person wearing the medal intends to convey a 
message (i.e., of having received a military decoration, of patriotism, 
etc.) and, based on the context of the communication, there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that the speaker’s message will be understood by 
viewers.141 
 Communicative conduct (expressive or symbolic speech) can be 
regulated if the regulation meets the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny 
test.142 Under the O’Brien test, the government can regulate communi-
cative conduct when: (1) there is an important government interest in 
regulating the speech unrelated to the suppression of the message and 
(2) the regulation’s impact on First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than what is essential to achieve the government interest.143 In O’Brien, 
the Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting the burning of draft 
cards was not an unconstitutional restriction of First Amendment 
speech because the government had an important interest, unrelated 
to the regulation of speech, in the administration of the draft and that 
draft cards were necessary to achieve that government interest.144 
 To satisfy intermediate scrutiny and regulate communicative con-
duct, the law cannot be hostile to speech.145 By requiring the govern-
ment interest to be unrelated to the suppression of speech, the O’Brien 
                                                                                                                      
136 Id. at 1139. 
137 Id. 
138 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. 
139 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06. 
140 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
141 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. 
142 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
143 Id. at 377. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 381–82. 
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test ensures that the speaker is not sanctioned for communicating, but 
instead is convicted for the non-communicative aspect of the con-
duct.146 This prevents the government from suppressing communica-
tive conduct simply because it disagrees with the message.147 
 The Ninth Circuit in Perelman held that § 704(a) of the Stolen Val-
or Act, which makes it a crime to wear a military decoration without 
authorization, is a constitutional restriction on communicative conduct 
because it meets the O’Brien test.148 The Ninth Circuit also held that the 
government has a compelling interest in preventing intentionally de-
ceptive medal-wearing and that this interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of speech because § 704(a) does not prevent the expression of any 
particular message or viewpoint.149 
D. Challenges on Overbreadth Grounds 
 In an area in which the government may permissibly regulate 
speech, such as incitement or defamation, a statute that regulates more 
expression than the Constitution allows may be unconstitutionally 
overbroad.150 For instance, if the court were to find the Stolen Valor 
Act constitutional as applied to an individual litigant, the Act may still 
be vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge because it may have uncon-
stitutional applications on its face.151 
                                                                                                                     
 The party asserting an overbreadth challenge must show that a 
substantial number of a statute’s applications are unconstitutional in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.152 An overbroad stat-
ute is unconstitutional even if the government exercises prosecutorial 
discretion and uses the statute only for its constitutional applications.153 
The overbreadth doctrine allows a speaker to whom the statute may be 
constitutionally applied to challenge the statute on grounds that it vio-
lates the First Amendment rights of someone else.154 Thus, the over-
 
146 See id. at 382. 
147 See id.; see also Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369 (striking down a statute that punished peo-
ple who expressed opposition to organized government by displaying a flag). 
148 Perelman II, 658 F.3d at 1140. 
149 Id. at 1139–40. 
150 See Chemerinsky, supra note 102, at 943. 
151 See United States v. McGuinn, No. 07 Cr. 471(KNF), 2007 WL 3050502, at *1–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007). 
152 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982). 
153 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1581; United States v. Lawless, No. 11-cr-475-PJM/11-mj-173-
TMD, slip op. at 8 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2011). 
154 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1593; see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 615–16 
(1973); Chemerinsky, supra note 102, at 943–46. 
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breadth doctrine is an exception to the rule against third-party stand-
ing.155 It has been described as “strong medicine” and is used spar-
ingly.156 The doctrine will only apply if the court finds that a statute was 
constitutionally applied to an individual litigant because, otherwise, the 
litigant would not have to rely on the overbreadth doctrine.157 
 The Stolen Valor Act, if found constitutionally applied to a particu-
lar litigant, may be found facially overbroad because of potential un-
constitutional applications of the statute.158 For instance, the Stolen 
Valor Act could be applied to a speaker who knowingly makes false 
statements about military decorations to send an anti-government or 
anti-military political message.159 Military decorations may also be worn 
to honor a loved one or for satirical purposes.160 Courts may find it dif-
ficult to determine whether someone is wearing military decorations to 
deceive or for a proper purpose.161 
 The Stolen Valor Act may also be considered overbroad because it 
does not contain a scienter requirement.162 Consequently, someone 
who has no intent to deceive may unknowingly violate the Act.163 For 
example, someone who says, “I have a Congressional Medal of Honor,” 
but simply means that they possess a Congressional Medal of Honor as 
a family heirloom, may technically violate the Act.164 
 The Stolen Valor Act will not be considered facially overbroad if it is 
readily susceptible to a construction that eliminates the overbreadth.165 
A scienter requirement is presumptively read into criminal statutes even 
                                                                                                                      
155 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1235 (Bybee, J., dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 102, at 
946. 
156 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. 
157 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1593; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1235 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
158 See McGuinn, 2007 WL 3050502, at *1–3. 
159 See id. Speech made for political purposes or other matters of public concern is tra-
ditionally entitled to increased First Amendment deference. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). 
160 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1236–37 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
161 Dane Schiller, Fake General: It Was Free Speech, Not Fraud: Man Faces Charges After Sport-
ing Medals at Mayor’s Party, Hous. Chron., Sept. 27, 2010, at B1. For example, in 2009, 
Michael McManus wore an Army brigadier general’s uniform and an array of medals and 
Distinguished Service Crosses to a party for Houston’s first openly gay mayor. Id. McManus 
is now being prosecuted under the Stolen Valor Act and claims that he never meant to 
suggest that he was a true war hero, but instead wore the medals in order to make a politi-
cal commentary about the military’s policy on gays. Id. 
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if not explicitly expressed in the statute.166 In United States v. Robbins, for 
example, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia read a 
scienter requirement into the Stolen Valor Act and found the Act consti-
tutional.167 
 The Stolen Valor Act will probably not be considered facially over-
broad because courts could read a scienter requirement into the stat-
ute.168 Therefore, the remainder of this Note will focus on the tension 
between the Stolen Valor Act and the First Amendment.169 The next 
Part argues that § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act is an unconstitutional 
violation of the First Amendment because it impermissibly proscribes 
protected speech, which warrants a strict scrutiny review that it cannot 
satisfy.170 
III. The Stolen Valor Act Unconstitutionally Restricts Speech 
in Violation of the First Amendment 
 This Part argues that § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act is unconsti-
tutional.171 It begins, in Section A, by demonstrating that the Stolen 
Valor Act regulates speech protected by the First Amendment.172 It es-
tablishes that there is no categorical exception to First Amendment 
protection for lies, that the Stolen Valor Act is not analogous to any cat-
egory of unprotected speech, and that no new category should be cre-
ated to cover lies about valor.173 Section B contends that prohibiting 
lies under the Stolen Valor Act constitutes a content-based restriction, 
an impermissible effort to restrict speech on grounds that it lacks 
value.174 Thus, strict scrutiny must be applied to verbal lies about mili-
tary decorations.175 Finally, Section C argues that § 704(b) of the Stolen 
Valor Act does not satisfy strict scrutiny for three reasons: (1) the gov-
ernment interests in the Stolen Valor Act are merely symbolic, (2) lies 
                                                                                                                      
166 United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68–69 (1994). 
167 759 F. Supp. 2d at 819. 
168 See id. The Heck Amendment attempts to address the constitutionality of the Stolen 
Valor Act by adding an explicit intent requirement to the statute. Stolen Valor Act of 2011, 
H.R. 1775, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill has been referred to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, but no hearings have 
been scheduled and no comparable legislation has been introduced in the Senate. Reply 
Brief for the United States at 6, Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (No. 08-50345). 
169 See infra notes 170–262 and accompanying text. 
170 See infra notes 171–262 and accompanying text. 
171 See infra notes 172–262 and accompanying text. 
172 See infra notes 177–202 and accompanying text. 
173 See infra notes 177–202 and accompanying text. 
174 See infra notes 203–219 and accompanying text. 
175 See infra notes 203–219 and accompanying text. 
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about military decorations do not harm any individual, and (3) there 
are less speech-restrictive means to achieve the government objective, 
most notably counterspeech about truly decorated veterans.176 
protection.180 
                                                                                                                     
A. The Stolen Valor Act Regulates Protected Speech 
 Lies are protected speech under the First Amendment.177 The 
First Amendment permits speech restrictions based on the content of 
the speech only in well-defined and limited areas, such as obscenity, 
defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal con-
duct.178 Thus, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1974 held that false statements of fact are not inherently wor-
thy of First Amendment protection, does not stand for the proposition 
that all false statements fall outside of First Amendment protection.179 
Indeed, only narrow categories, such as defamation, have been carved 
out from First Amendment 
 Lies prohibited under the Stolen Valor Act do not fall into any of 
the categories that receive less First Amendment protection.181 The Sto-
 
 
176 See infra notes 220–262 and accompanying text. 
177 See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 11-210). 
178 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1580 (2010); Chaplinsky v. State of N.H., 
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
179 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974); Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 
1202–03. But see Christopher P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 669, 717–18 
(2010) (advocating predictable liability for false scientific speech). 
180 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1581; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1206–07; see also Chaplinsky, 315 
U.S. at 571–72 (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”). First Amendment exceptions must be narrowly tailored in order to protect 
First Amendment rights. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
181 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1580. As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski notes, “[L]iving means 
lying.” United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674–75 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., con-
curring). 
Saints may always tell the truth, but for mortals living means lying. We lie to 
protect our privacy (“No, I don’t live around here”); to avoid hurt feelings 
(“Friday is my study night”); to make others feel better (“Gee you’ve gotten 
skinny”); to avoid recriminations (“I only lost $10 at poker”); to prevent grief 
(“The doc says you’re getting better”); to maintain domestic tranquility 
(“She’s just . . . a friend”); to avoid social stigma (“I just haven’t met the right 
woman”); for career advancement (“I’m sooo lucky to have a smart boss like 
you”); to avoid being lonely (“I love opera”); to eliminate a rival (“He has a 
boyfriend”); to achieve an objective (“But I love you so much”); to defeat an 
objective (“I’m allergic to latex”); to make an exit (“It’s not you, it’s me”); to 
delay the inevitable (“The check is in the mail”); to communicate displeasure 
(“There’s nothing wrong”); to get someone off your back (“I’ll call you about 
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len Valor Act differs in significant respects from false and misleading 
consumer speech, fraudulent speech, and defamation, for example— 
categories of speech that do not receive First Amendment protection.182 
Lies under the Stolen Valor Act are not false and misleading commer-
cial speech, for example, because they are not intended to make a prof-
it.183 Likewise, lies criminalized by the Stolen Valor Act are not necessar-
ily fraudulent because the Act does not require a person to act in 
reliance on the lie or for the lie to cause individual harm.184 And unlike 
defamation, false statements covered under the Act need not be tar-
geted nor must they have caused individualized harm to another per-
son.185 Instead, the Stolen Valor Act broadly criminalizes all lies about 
military decorations without first establishing individualized harm.186 
Because of these distinctions, lies the Stolen Valor Act prohibits are not 
analogous to and thus are not included in one of the well-defined and 
                                                                                                                      
lunch”); to escape a nudnik (“My mother’s on the other line”); to namedrop 
(“We go way back”); to set up a surprise party (“I need help moving the pi-
ano”); to buy time (“I’m on my way”); to keep up appearances (“We’re not 
talking divorce”); to avoid taking out the trash (“My back hurts”); to duck an 
obligation (“I’ve got a headache”); to maintain a public image (“I go to 
church every Sunday”); to make a point (“Ich bin ein Berliner”); to save face 
(“I had too much to drink”); to humor (“Correct as usual, King Friday”); to 
avoid embarrassment (“That wasn’t me”); to curry favor (“I’ve read all your 
books”); to get a clerkship (“You’re the greatest living jurist”); to save a dollar 
(“I gave at the office”); or to maintain innocence (“There are eight tiny rein-
deer on the rooftop”). 
Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674–75. 
182 See 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); State of Wash. ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 
Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 697 (Wash. 1998); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 
96, at 731. 
183 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 n.24 (1976). The regulation of false and misleading commercial speech has been justi-
fied because (1) consumers are not in a position to discriminate between false and true 
commercial speech, (2) the truth and falsity of commercial speech is objective and well 
suited for verification, and (3) commercial speech is considered particularly resilient to 
regulation, and thus there is less of a concern for chilling speech. See id. False and decep-
tive advertisements distort the marketplace of ideas and may be less likely than non-
commercial speech to be corrected by the marketplace of ideas. See id. 
184 See 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 96, at 731. If 
Strandlof lied to steal money from the veterans group, it would be fraud; there is no need 
for a separate statute preventing people from using false claims of valor to prevent fraud. 
Felisa Cardona, Stolen Valor Act Unconstitutional, Federal Judge Rules, Denver Post, July 17, 
2010, at A1. 
185 119 Vote No! Committee, 957 P.2d at 697. 
186 See 18 U.S.C. § 704. 
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narrow categories of speech that receives less First Amendment protec-
tion.187 
 Furthermore, false statements regarding military decorations do 
not fit into one of the narrow categories of speech lacking First 
Amendment protection because lies can be important parts of 
speech.188 The First Amendment reflects the belief that the govern-
ment must not be able to restrict speech simply because it determines 
that some speech is not worthwhile.189 Society must tolerate the expres-
sion of unpopular ideas or topics.190 In a democracy, citizens should be 
prepared to challenge what they hear and to engage in vigorous public 
debate.191 Public discourse must not be at the mercy of the government 
acting as “the truth police.”192 Allowing the government, or even a jury, 
to decide what is true and what is false and permitting speech restric-
tions on that basis would prevent free expression and the marketplace 
of ideas from flourishing.193 
 In addition, a new category of unprotected speech should not be 
created to cover the speech regulated by the Stolen Valor Act.194 The 
Supreme Court has refused to carve out categorical exceptions to First 
Amendment protection in several notable cases and should continue to 
do so in the Stolen Valor Act.195 The Supreme Court has recently re-
fused to carve out categorical First Amendment exceptions for animal 
cruelty, protests at military funerals, and violent video games.196 Al-
though animal cruelty, protests at funerals, and violent videogames, like 
lies about military decorations, are repugnant types of speech, the First 
                                                                                                                      
187 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
188 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1964). 
189 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. The Court wrote: 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to cat-
egories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and 
benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American 
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the 
costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply 
on the basis that some speech is not worth it. 
Id. 
190 Id. 
191 See id. 
192 Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
193 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–40. 
194 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
195 See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011); Snyder v. Phelps, 
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 n.3 (2011); Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
196 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 n.3; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 
1585. 
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Amendment reflects a belief that loathsome speech must be tolerated 
to protect freedom of speech and to encourage full and vigorous de-
bate.197 
 New categories of unprotected speech should only be created in 
the most extreme circumstances.198 For example, in 1982 in New York v. 
Ferber, the Supreme Court created a new category of unprotected 
speech for child pornography because the market for child pornogra-
phy was intrinsically related to the underlying child abuse; the distribu-
tion of material depicting sex acts with children was thought to pro-
mote the performance of such acts.199 Thus, the creation of a new 
category of unprotected speech was necessary because the creation of 
child pornography is inextricably linked to the act of harming chil-
dren.200 Lies prohibited by the Stolen Valor Act, in contrast, do not 
cause any physical harm or abuse and thus do not rise to the level of 
the child pornography in Ferber.201 Accordingly, creating a new category 
of unprotected speech for falsely claiming receipt of military decora-
tions is unjustified.202 
B. Section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act Is a Content-Based Speech Restriction 
and, Therefore, Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny 
 Section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act is a content-based speech 
restriction because the government specifically regulates false speech 
about military honors.203 The government, in other words, singles out 
certain liars for criminal punishment based on the content of their lies: 
those that lie about military decorations may be criminally sanctioned, 
                                                                                                                      
197 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 n.3; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 
1585. 
198 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (2003). 
199 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749, 759. Completely digital child pornography that does not 
involve any real children is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. Ash-
croft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250, 256 (2002). 
200 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759–60. Child pornography does not lack protection because 
it lacks value; a central tenant of the First Amendment is that the government may not 
restrict expression simply because society finds the content offensive or disagreeable. Tex-
as v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46, 55–56 (1988); City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). 
201 See 458 U.S. at 759. 
202 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586. 
203 See 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980); Chemerinsky, 
supra note 102, at 934. 
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but those that lie about other topics may not be.204 For example, a lie 
about saving thousands of lives as a brain surgeon would go unpun-
ished, but a similar lie about saving lives in war and becoming a deco-
rated military veteran might not.205 
 Whether a statement is protected under the First Amendment is 
not subject to an ad hoc balancing of the relative social costs and bene-
fits of the speech.206 Instead the First Amendment presumptively pro-
tects all speech, including false statements.207 Granted, and as the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized in United States v. Al-
varez in 2010, there is very little value to false claims of military decora-
tions.208 But the majority in Alvarez was concerned about setting a prec-
edent for government regulation of speech simply because it is a lie.209 
This concern is valid, particularly because upholding the Stolen Valor 
Act would permit content-based speech regulation and allow the gov-
ernment to make judgments about which topics to restrict.210 
 The government must not decide what speech is particularly intol-
erable and proscribe it on that ground.211 The First Amendment, does 
not tolerate government regulation that hinges on content-based dis-
crimination.212 Therefore, courts must apply strict scrutiny and prevent 
government regulation of stolen valor lies; otherwise, there is little 
stopping the government from criminalizing other types of lies, such as 
lying about age on a first date, about financial status on Facebook, or 
about drinking, smoking, or sex in a conversation with a parent.213 It is 
                                                                                                                      
 
204 See 18 U.S.C. § 704; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (stating that 
the concern with content-based discrimination is that the government will drive certain 
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace). 
205 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387. 
206 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (explaining that such a balancing test would be “star-
tling and dangerous”). 
207 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1205 (“The right to speak and write whatever one chooses—
including, to some degree, worthless, offensive and demonstrable untruths—without cow-
ering in fear of a powerful government is, in our view, an essential component of the pro-
tection afforded by the First Amendment.”). 
208 See id. at 1217 (“We have no doubt that society would be better off if Mr. Alvarez 
would stop spreading worthless, ridiculous and offensive untruths.”). 
209 See id. at 1200. 
210 See id. 
211 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219; Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
212 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. 
213 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
[I]f the Act is constitutional under the analysis proffered by Judge Bybee, 
then there would be no constitutional bar to criminalizing lying about one’s 
height, weight, age, or financial status on Match.com or Facebook, or falsely 
representing to one’s mother that one does not smoke, drink alcoholic bev-
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a dangerous precedent to allow the government to decide that certain 
lies are particularly troublesome and thus to ban them from public dis-
course.214 
 Content-based speech restrictions are presumptively invalid, unless 
the speech falls into a narrow and well-defined category of unprotected 
speech.215 Moreover, the government has the burden of rebutting the 
presumption of unconstitutionality.216 As discussed in Section A, § 
704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act does not fit into any category of false 
factual speech that is outside of First Amendment protection.217 There-
fore, the government must meet strict scrutiny to restrict this speech.218 
And, as will be discussed in Section C, this section of the Stolen Valor 
Act does not meet strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to 
meet a compelling government interest.219 
C. Strict Scrutiny Analysis: Government Interests in the Stolen Valor Act Do Not 
Warrant a Speech Restriction 
 This Section argues that the government interests protected by the 
Stolen Valor Act are symbolic and, at most, prevent a generalized public 
harm.220 These interests are not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny and 
justify a restriction of First Amendment freedoms.221 Furthermore, any 
harm associated with lies about military decorations can be addressed 
effectively by government counterspeech publicizing true medal re-
cipients.222 
                                                                                                                      
erages, is a virgin, or has not exceeded the speed limit while driving on the 
freeway. 
Id. 
214 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
215 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72; see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“We 
cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying 
instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are 
truly implicated.”). 
216 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1580; United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 
817 (2000). 
217 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
218 United States v. Perelman (Perelman I ), 737 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1238 (D. Nev. 2010), 
aff’d, 658 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2011). Under strict scrutiny, the most stringent form of judi-
cial review, the court will determine whether the restriction on a fundamental right is nec-
essary to the furtherance of a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest. Haggerty, supra note 15, at 1126. 
219 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
220 See infra notes 223–230 and accompanying text. 
221 See infra notes 231–249 and accompanying text. 
222 See infra notes 250–262 and accompanying text. 
802 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:775 
1. Symbolic Government Interests Do Not Justify Restricting First 
Amendment Freedoms 
 Symbolic interests are not sufficient to justify a restriction of First 
Amendment rights.223 In 1989 in Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court 
invalidated statutes enforced in forty-eight states that prohibited flag 
desecration.224 In Johnson, the State of Texas argued that there is a 
compelling state interest in preserving the American flag as a symbol of 
national unity and, additionally, that statutes prohibiting flag desecra-
tion prevent breaches of the peace.225 The Supreme Court in Johnson 
rejected both of the government’s arguments and invalidated the state 
statutes.226 The Court held that symbolic interests, such as the govern-
ment interest in maintaining the American flag as a symbol of national 
unity, are not sufficient to justify a restriction of First Amendment free-
doms.227 
 Like statutes prohibiting flag burning, the Stolen Valor Act seeks to 
protect the dignity and sanctity of a government symbol against people 
who, according to the government, desecrate or misuse that symbol.228 
Through the Stolen Valor Act, the government also seeks to maintain 
the honor associated with military service medals.229 This interest in pre-
serving the message or meaning associated with a government symbol, 
however, is insufficient to justify a restriction of First Amendment 
rights.230 
2. No Individual Is Harmed by Lies Regarding Military Decorations 
 The First Amendment precludes punishment for generalized pub-
lic frauds, deceptions, and defamation.231 Said differently, the First 
Amendment does not allow the regulation of false speech simply on the 
grounds that it poses a general threat of harm to a group of individu-
als.232 Consequently, the government generally does not regulate false 
speech unless there is a showing of individualized harm, as in the def-
                                                                                                                      
223 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 401; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 22. 
224 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
225 Id. at 400. 
226 See id. at 406. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 400; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216. 
229 Government’s Answering Brief, supra note 18, at 6. 
230 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 22. 
231 Fried, supra note 75, at 238. 
232 Lidsky, supra note 71, at 1091–92. 
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amation or fraud contexts.233 The law, in other words, does not punish 
liars simply for lying, but instead relies on the marketplace of ideas for 
the truth to come to light and the liar to suffer public disapproval and 
loss of trust.234 
 Holocaust denial is an example of a type of speech that harms a 
general class of citizens but not one individual in particular.235 Because 
it only inflicts generalized harm, there is no law prohibiting Holocaust 
denial in the United States.236 Though there has not been a Supreme 
Court case on the issue, prosecutions for Holocaust denial would likely 
violate the First Amendment.237 
 Unlike speech that causes generalized harm, speech that causes 
demonstrable harm to a particular individual can be limited without 
running afoul of the Constitution.238 For example, defamation law al-
lows plaintiffs to recover monetary damages in a civil suit in order to 
protect an individual property interest in reputation.239 
 Like Holocaust denial and unlike defamation, there are no par-
ticular plaintiffs harmed by the lies covered under the Stolen Valor 
Act.240 Instead, the harm is a generalized harm to the honor of the gov-
ernment and all veterans who have received honors.241 In addition, and 
unlike in a defamation case, there is no individual plaintiff or identifi-
                                                                                                                      
233 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584; Stolen Valor, N.J.L.J., Oct. 18, 2010, at 22. (“Aside from 
the Stolen Valor Act, we as a nation have been content to allow our disgraced, non perjur-
ing liars to suffer their public and private humiliation outside of prison, so long as no indi-
vidual is harmed; if someone is swindled or otherwise injured by deliberate false state-
ments of fact, a host of civil and criminal penalties await the scoundrel who uttered 
them.”). 
234 Stolen Valor, supra note 233, at 286. Even objectively verifiable lies are not regulated, 
such as the number of arrests or whether a cafeteria was barricaded in N.Y. Times. See 376 
U.S. at 257–58. 
235 See Lidsky, supra note 71, at 1091–92. 
236 See id. Unlike the United States, several European countries have laws prohibiting 
Holocaust denial. See id. 
237 See Varat, supra note 69, at 1116–20. 
238 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 96, at 479–80. 
239 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 14 (“[The] exception [of defamation] 
. . . [is] justified chiefly by the desire to prevent injury to a specific person’s reputation.”); 
see Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 829–30 n.7 (Wash. 2007). A 
defamation plaintiff can recover for defamatory falsehoods about a private individual re-
garding a matter of public concern if the defamatory statement is negligently made and 
cause actual reputational harm or if they are made with knowledge of their falsity or reck-
less disregard for the truth. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–49. 
240 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323, 341. 
241 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216. 
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able victim in a criminal prosecution under the Stolen Valor Act.242 In-
stead, the criminal prosecution proceeds in the name of the govern-
ment and the general public; there is no private right of action for in-
dividual veterans who claim they were harmed by a person’s lie about 
military decorations.243 Therefore, because there is a difference be-
tween civil defamation suits, which seek to remedy private harm, and 
the Stolen Valor Act, which punishes a speaker for causing generalized, 
public harm, § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act is unconstitutional.244 
 Certainly, lying about military service is a particularly egregious lie, 
but it may not have the dire impact on the honor of military decora-
tions as the government suggested in Alvarez.245 First, service people’s 
heroism in combat is not motivated simply by the hopes of receiving 
military decorations.246 Service people are motivated by loftier goals, 
such as a duty to serve their country and fellow service people.247 Re-
gardless of the severity of even the generalized harm, whether the lies 
regarding military decorations cause any particularized harm to indi-
vidual veterans honored by military decorations is questionable.248 
 In sum, the Stolen Valor Act is designed to prevent a generalized, 
public harm, the government interests in the Act are symbolic, and 
therefore do not justify a restriction of First Amendment freedoms.249 
3. Effective Counterspeech Could Address the Government’s Concerns 
About Stolen Valor 
 Another reason the harm from lies covered under § 704(b) of the 
Stolen Valor Act is not sufficient to meet strict scrutiny is because there 
                                                                                                                      
242 See id. at 1200; United States v. Strandlof, No. 09-cr-00497-REB, 2010 WL 4235395, 
at *1 (D. Colo. July 16, 2010); Perelman I, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
243 See Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200; Strandlof, 2010 WL 4235395, at *1; Perelman I, 737 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1238. 
244 Fried, supra note 75, at 238 (distinguishing defamation from political campaigns 
where “the grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are immune from legal 
sanction unless individuals are harmed”). “Group libels” have been recognized in some 
cases where there is proof that a particular member of a group is the subject of a defama-
tory statement. See Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1987). 
This is inapplicable here because a particular member of the group is not the subject of a 
defamatory statement. Id.; see Strandlof, 2010 WL 4235395, at *6–7 n.7. 
245 See 617 F.3d at 1219. 
246 Strandlof, 2010 WL 4235395, at *5 (“To suggest that the battlefield heroism of our 
servicemen and women is motivated in any way, let alone in a compelling way, by consid-
erations of whether a medal may be awarded simply defies my comprehension.”). 
247 See id. 
248 Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200 (comparing lies about military decorations to lying on dat-
ing websites). 
249 Strandlof, 2010 WL 4235395, at *4. 
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are ample ways for the government to engage in effective counter-
speech, especially by publicizing the names of true award recipients.250 
 In a democracy and in the marketplace of ideas, it is the public’s 
prerogative to question what they hear, and the best remedy for false 
speech is counterspeech.251 This is one reason false commercial speech 
falls outside First Amendment protection—consumers are not in a 
good position to determine the truth about advertised products.252 
There is an imbalance of power between the consumer and the adver-
tiser.253 Likewise, one of the key considerations in a defamation suit is 
whether the plaintiff is a public figure.254 It is more difficult for public 
figures to recover for defamation-based harms because they are better 
able than the average nonpublic individual to engage in effective coun-
terspeech.255 
 An imbalance of power similar to that in false commercial speech 
or defamation of a nonpublic figure does not exist between the person 
who lies about military decorations and the public.256 Members of the 
general public are fit to discriminate between liars and truly decorated 
veterans by educating themselves on who has and who has not received 
particular military decorations.257 For instance, the United States has 
created websites where the general public can access a database of 
Congressional Medal of Honor recipients.258 In addition, online groups 
have organized to track down and publicize names of people who have 
falsely claimed to be decorated veterans of the military.259 Similar web-
                                                                                                                      
 
250 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that the appropriate “remedy to be applied” to objectionable speech “is more speech, 
not enforced silence”). 
251 See id.; see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) ( Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“[E]very person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not 
trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.”). 
252 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377. 
253 See id. 
254 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 256. 
255 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
256 See, e.g., The Epidemic of Military Imposters—Are These Individuals Heroes or Villains?, 
POW Network, http://www.pownetwork.org/phonies/phonies.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 
2012) [hereinafter The Epidemic of Military Imposters] (including pictures posted for people 
to identify imposters); Recipients, Cong. Medal of Honor Soc’y, http://www.cmohs.org/ 
recipient-archive.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). 
257 Strandlof, 2010 WL 4235395, at *6; see, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., 
concurring); The Epidemic of Military Imposters, supra note 256; Recipients, supra note 256. As 
the old saying goes, “Believe nothing of what you hear, and only half of what you see.” The 
Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs 17 ( Jennifer Speake ed., 2009). 
258 See Recipients, supra note 256. 
259 See, e.g., The Epidemic of Military Imposters, supra note 256; Recipients, supra note 256. 
Note that it may be beneficial for the public to know who has stolen valor so they can be 
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sites should be set up for all of the military decorations covered by the 
Stolen Valor Act.260 
 Online databases are effective and efficient ways to publicize the 
names of true medal recipients, alert the public to the issue of stolen 
valor, and provide an easy way for citizens to determine if people really 
received honors.261 The existence of such databases also indicates that 
the marketplace of ideas already identifies and makes public the people 
who lie about receiving military decorations; thus, they are effective 
counterspeech.262 
Conclusion 
 Categories of speech that fall outside of First Amendment protec-
tion must be narrowly defined to protect First Amendment freedoms. 
Section 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act does not fit into any category of 
false factual speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment. This 
section of the Stolen Valor Act is a content-based speech restriction be-
cause the government seeks to regulate speech on a particular sub-
ject—false speech about military honors. Because the speech pro-
scribed is not covered under any category of unprotected speech, a new 
category of unprotected speech should not be created, and because the 
law imposes content-based restrictions, the government must meet 
strict scrutiny in order for § 704(b) of the Stolen Valor Act to pass con-
stitutional muster. The Stolen Valor Act does not meet strict scrutiny 
because it is not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government 
interest. It is therefore unconstitutional. 
Kathryn Smith 
 
aware that the person is a liar and not trust other statements they may make. See The Epi-
demic of Military Imposters, supra note 256. 
260 See The Epidemic of Military Imposters, supra note 256; Recipients, supra note 256. 
261 See The Epidemic of Military Imposters, supra note 256; Recipients, supra note 256. 
262 See, e.g., The Epidemic of Military Imposters, supra note 256; Recipients, supra note 256. 
